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OWNING WHAT DOESN'T EXIST
STEPHEN L. CARTER*
I.
To a teacher of intellectual property, it is fascinating to listen
to a day of debate about a thing called "property" that every-
one seems to agree is something that one can hold or hide or
fence off. To teach intellectual property-to think seriously
about intellectual property-you have to brush aside a vision of
concrete, tangible things in which the possessor might be
vested with a number of rights, the "bundle" of rights so dear
to our discourses. And you have to step away from the marvel-
ous vision that private ownership of property, and lots of it, is
the very fundament of a democratic and free society, not be-
cause the vision is wrong-on the contrary, it has much to rec-
ommend it1-but because, in teaching intellectual property, it
is largely beside the point.
Intellectual property, as I like to tease and maybe even teach
my students, might best be described as a system of rights in
things that are not really there, which is why I often describe
the proprietary rights that intellectual property rules vest as
owning what doesn't exist. It is precisely because intellectual prop-
erty involves rights in intangible things that it is so difficult to
justify intellectual property rules with the same arguments used
to justify a system of property rights in things that you can hold
in your hand or hide from your neighbor or fence off.
There has been a great deal of discussion at this symposium
about the libertarian as against the utilitarian as against the nat-
ural rights basis for property law. If you look at intellectual
property rules, this debate becomes particularly puzzling and
complex. Although I know Judge Easterbrook disagrees,2 I be-
lieve that it is quite difficult to justify intellectual property rules
on a libertarian model, whether an anarchist libertarian model
or a shadow-government, night-watchman state model.
Thus the anarchist libertarian can think of property as a
• Professor of Law,'Yale Law School.
1. See Carter, The Constitution, the Uniqueness Puzzle, and the Economic Conditions ofDemoc-
racy, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136 (1987).
2. See Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 109,
113 (1990).
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thing that is out there to hold or hide or fence off. The night-
watchman state of the shadow-government libertarian can per-
mit some regulation to enable efficient exchange, both for
promise-keeping and, as Richard Epstein pointed out in his paper,
to prevent third partiesfrom interfering with advantageous relations be-
tween people who want to exchange things that they would
otherwise hold or hide or fence off.3
But the libertarian cannot easily explain government regula-
tion of intellectual property. Even though intellectual property
rules, like tangible property rules, might also exist to permit
people to exchange their possessions more efficiently, one
needs a rather intrusive regulatory regime to enforce them.
The government must make a series of fine and subtle distinc-
tions about what to protect.4 We have an enormously complex
system of rules to sort out which gains a creator may appropri-
ate from which creations, and I am not sure that is possible to
devise a simple rule-a night-watchman state rule-that would
do it. I think you would find that most of those who write on
intellectual property today justify the rules either on the moral
ground that each ofus possesses a natural right to control what
we create or on the utilitarian ground that absent regulation,
there will be no optimal supply of intellectual creations.
In this brief presentation, I will not try to give the natural
rights argument the full treatment that it deserves, except to
note my fear that the natural rights approach ultimately leads
to such elitist and despotic doctrines as "moral right," lately
incorporated by the Congress (to an extent that the courts will
ultimately have to tell us, because the Congress has fudged the
point) in American law.5 The moral right doctrine says that
once an artist has sold a portrait to a collector, the artist can
keep the collector from painting a mustache on it for private
pleasure, or that once a filmmaker has sold the rights to a
black-and-white motjon picture, ,the filmmaker can keep the
3. See Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV.].L. & PUB. POL'y 2, 5-6 (1990). See
generally Symposium: Time, Property Rights and the Common Law: Round Table Discussion, 64
WASH. U.L.Q, 793, 793-800 (1986).
4. In the particular case ofpatent law, it is difficult for the libertarian to explain why
the fact that A, in the privacy ofher own basement, thinks ofan idea first and obtains a
certificate from the government, should prevent B, in the privacy of his own basement,
from using the same idea, provided that B thinks of it independently.
5. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988).
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owner from adding color for further profit.6
Now, don't misunderstand me-I am not in favor of the de-
facing of paintings or the colorization of black-and-white films.
I consider those acts uncultured. But you cannot legislate cul-
ture. What the moral right doctrine really says is that the own-
ers of these things-a painting, for example, or a motion
picture-should not have the right to do with their possessions
as they wish.7 Under some versions of the moral right doctrine,
the owner cannot purchase the creator's moral rights, even if
the creator wants to sell them, because the rights are inaliena-
ble. The painter cannot sell the right to approve any changes in
the painting. The filmmaker cannot sell the right to veto
changes in the film.
The idea that the government should enable the artist to for-
bid the owner's acts, or, as some suggest, should make the art-
ist's right to forbid inalienable, is worse than uncultured. It is
classic special-interest legislation, regulating the ability of an
owner to do with her property as she likes, not so much for the
benefit of artists or filmmakers as such, but for the benefit of a
minority who will feel better knowing that the owner is not al-
lowed to act in an uncultured way.8
But I said that I would skip the natural rights argument. I
want to discuss the utilitarian argument, which in my view sub-
sumes the various aspects of the efficiency argument.9
My claim, which I will sketch here with very light strokes, is
that the utilitarian argument can justify in a fairly straightfor-
ward way nationwide federal protection of patents and copy-
rights but has trouble justifying much more trademark
regulation than is offered by the common law of unfair compe-
tition, which predated federal trademark protection and contin-
ues to co-exist with it. 10 I am not arguing against federal
6. For an amusing romp along the contours of the moral right doctrine, see Mer-
ryman, The Refrigerator ofBernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS LJ. 1023 (1976).
7. For an admittedly jocular suggestion that moral right legislation might be uncon-
stitutional, see Carter, Flags and Films: Freedom to Desecrate, Legal Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at
31, col. 1.
8. Ifmoral right legislation really is for the benefit ofa small minority rather than the
general public (which might want to see the colorized version), it might run afoul of
Cass Sunstein's proposed prohibition on legislation that is not public-regarding. See,
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
9. For a valiant but unsuccessful effort to separate the two, ~ee R. POSNER, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
10. For a more detailed explication of this argument, see Carter, The Trouble With
Trademark, 99 YALE LJ. 759 (1990).
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trademark law, but I do want to note how some of the distinc~
tions between patents and copyrights on the one hand, and
trademarks on the other, make the case for nationwide protec~
tion stronger for patents and copyrights, and weaker for trade~
marks. These distinctions might help explain why the
Constitution expressly empowers the Congress to create uni~
form rules for patents and copyrights but makes no mention of
trademarks.u The Founders evidently did not expect nation~
wide trademark protection under federal government control,
and perhaps here, as in so many other instances, they were on
to something.12
II.
The utilitarian arguments for both patents and copyrights
are well understood. Patents and copyrights grant rights in in~
tangible creations of the mind. The~e intellectual creations are
public goods. They are non-excludable, in the sense that once
they are brought forth from the mind, they can generally be
taken by a second user at a cost close to zero, and they are
subject to non-rivalrous consumption, in the sense that one user's
use of the idea does not reduce the value of the idea to another
who wishes to use it.
All of this makes it nearly impossible for the originator of the
thing to appropriate the gains at reasonable cost. Thus, without
a means of providing a return to the originator, there will be a
less than optimal supply.13 There are essentially two ways of
providing a return. One of these is a subsidy, a direct payment
to the originator. 14 The second possibility is regulation, gov~
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o pro-
mote the Progress ofScience and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."); if.
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding that because federal trademark law
must rest on the Commerce Clause, it may reach only trademarks used in interstate
commerce).
12. Although the term "unfair competition" did not occur in Anglo-American juris-
prudence until 1803, see Hogg v. Kirby, 32 Eng. Rep. 336 (1803), the idea that goods
might be distinguished by a mark placed upon them by the maker was a much older
one and was certainly well known by 1789. The leading early case is Blanchard v. Hill, 2
Atk. 484 (Ch. 1742).
13. Unfortunately, nothing in the utilitarian argument can determine what supply is
optimal. See Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Comment 011
Cheung, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 19 (1986).
14. Before the invention of the printing press, subsidy was in fact the principal
means for compensating the creator of a literary work. A fascinating dip into this his-
tory is H. RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 17-53 (1956).
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ernment intervention in which the state uses its authority to
prohibit others from taking part of the gains.
To say that this is all well-known is not to say that there are
no hard cases. For example, what items are among those that
without regulations will exist only in less-than-optimal supply?
Do animal life forms that might be created in the laboratory
count?I5 Does computer software count?16 And if computer
software does need protection, lest it be undersupplied, one
must decide which aspects of software count as the proper sub-
jects of protection. How it works? How it looks? How the user
interacts with it? These are all matters of current debate, and
the answers are hardly clear. I7 The hard cases, however, are at
the margins. The rules themselves are clear, even if the conse-
quences of the well-known theory are not always fully under-
stood by government regulators.
For example, I was recently involved in a case challenging a
tax assessment in which a city sought to tax the full value of
computer software under a statute that theretofore had been
used only to tax tangible personal property. IS Evidently, the
city's theory was that once a copy of the software is embodied
somewhere-for example, on a disk-the program itself be-
comes tangible, even though every court that had taken a posi-
tion had held software to be intangible rather than tangible
property. The assessor said in effect, "There is the disk, it is
tangible, and therefore, the full value of the software is taxable
as tangible personal property."
Were things so simple we would not need the elaborate
structure of rules that we have to govern intellectual property.
But the embodiment of software on a disk changes nothing. If
you transfer the disk, you transfer the entire idea, because un-
less the law prevents it, the transferee now possesses the same
freedom to exploit the software that the creator does. So you
still cannot make a profit on the software without the rules that
are necessitated by its intangible character. Put otherwise, if the
15. See Note, Altering Nature's Blueprintsfor Profit: Patenting Multicellular Animals, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1327 (1988).
16. See generally Menell, TaillJring Legal Protectionfor Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1329 (1987).
17. Compare Russo & Derwin, Copyright in the "Look and Feel" ofComputer Software, COM-
PUTER LAw., Feb. 1985, at I, with Samuelson, Why the Look and Feel ofSoftware User Inter-
faces Should Not Be Protected by Copyright Law, 32 COMM. ACM 563 (1989).
18. See Northeast Datacom, Inc. v. Wallingford, 212 Conn. 639, 563 A.2d 688
(1989).
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act of embodying a copy of the software on a disk means that
the software is thereafter subject to protection under the rules
governing tangible personal property, there will still be a less-
than-optimal supply.
To make a long story short, the rules generated by the utilita-
rian argument are often hard to apply and are sometimes mis-
applied even in easy cases. Still, the rules are fairly clear,
especially now that" Congress has rewritten its copyright and
trademark acts and altered substantial portions of its patent
act. 19 The utilitarian argument itself, however, is fairly contro-
versial, and many of its implications are weakly understood. An
example of this misunderstanding is the common claim-in-
deed, it is practically an axiom of intellectual property law-
that patents and copyrights are monopolies.
If monopoly is defined as any right to exclude, the claim is
unexceptionable. But it is also irrelevant. For as Judge Easter-
brook has argued here,20 and Professor Kitch has argued else-
where,21 what matters is not exclusivity-type monopoly as such,
but rather the function of the intellectual property rights in the
market. That is, what matters is what the owner of the rights
can do with them.
As Professor Kitch has shown, market pressures will often
make it difficult for patent owners to extract monopoly rents.22
Demand is likely to be highly elastic because of the availablity
of substitutes for the patented invention, especially when the
invention is trying to find its niche in the market. And as the
patent term nears its end, not only will fresh substitute technol-
ogies likely be available, but competitors will be gearing up to
undercut the patentee's prices.
The same is if anything truer of copyrights. Demand for par-
ticular books is likely to be quite elastic because there are lots of
substitutes. For example, in a book market where hardcover fic-
tion tops out around twenty-five dollars, even a very fine liter-
ary work will have trouble finding a niche at fifty dollars or
19. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100·568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988) (copyright); Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100·
667, 102 Stat: 3935 (1988) (trademark); Process Patent Amendment Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-418, §§ 9001·07, 102 Stat. 1563 (1988) (patent).
20. See Easterbrook, supra note 2.
21. See Kitch! Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights'!, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31 (1986).
22. See id.
HeinOnline -- 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y  105 1990
No.1] Owning What Doesn't Exist 105
seventy-five dollars. Thus copyrights, like patents, are not nec-
essarily monopolies in any market power sense.
In short, aside from some problems at the margins, I think
that the patent and copyright systems are easy to understand
and straightforward to justify, at least from the utilitarian
perspective.
III.
Trademark law is different. There is no such animal as a less-
than-optimal supply of trademarks. The reason for protecting
trademarks is not that we think it is great when individuals
think ofnew ideas for little symbols and words to describe their
products. A trademark identifies the maker of a good, and
trademarks are protected for the identjfying function that they
serve in the market. A trademark is a convenient way of giving
the person searching in the market a great deal of information
in a very small package. Trademarks are protected because they
lower consumer search costs, enabling people to make quicker,
cheaper decisions about what they want to buy.23
This theory is fairly well understood. What is often misun-
derstood is that all that this argument can clearly justify is the
common-law system of trademark protection that existed prior
to 1946.24 To win a trademark case under the comm~m-Iawsys-
tem, you brought an action for unfair competition. This re-
quired a showing that a competitor, by copying the mark used
to distinguish your goods in the market, was diverting custom-
ers that would otherwise have come to yoU.25 Since the enact-
ment of the Lanham Act in 1946,26 howev~r, federal
registration of a trademark has provided nationwide rights
even in markets that the registrant might never enter and
where the mark means nothing at all.
The courts don't like this doctrine and, although they have
been criticized for it, have refused to apply the Act literally. In-
stead, the courts have followed the common-law model, ex-
tending trademark protection only in the markets that the
23. For a more extensive presentation of this justification for trademarks, see Landes
& Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987).
24. The following argument is adapted from Carter, supra note 10.
25. See, e.g., Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U.S. 132 (1927); American
Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
26. Trademark Act of 1946,60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (1988».
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registrant has actually entered.27 This approach makes perfect
sense so long as you believe that the function of trademarks is
to provide information in the market. Others are free to use the
mark in markets that the registrant has never entered because
the other users will not be misleading: The mark ll].eans noth~
ing to consumers in those markets.
Nevertheless, we just recently dodged a bullet-the Con~
gress last year nearly enacted the Senate's version of the Trade~
mark Law Revision Act. The version of the Revision Act finally
adopted is bad enough because it allows application for regis~
tration of a mark that has never been used and allows some
rights-de facto if not de jure-to follow upon application
rather than awaiting registration.28 It does not, however, grant
any formal right for an applicant to prevent someone from us~
ing the mark in question until the applicant has used it too.
(The Senate's version would on a fair interpretation have al~
lowed some formal, substantive rights in marks that had never
been used.)
My goal, however, is not to argue the merits of the Revision
Act, but rather to point out that there is a substantial cost to a
nationwide system of trademark protection. Other people who
may independently select your registered mark are forbidden
to use it, even if it signifies to consumers only their goods and
not your goods. This prohibition is not a problem if one mark
is as good as another, but as anyone involved in the marketing
of goods can tell you, some marks are better than others. Sub~
stantial work goes into determining which mark will work best
to sell which good. Naturally, no one wants to be stuck with an
inferior mark. If superior marks are a finite set, however, then
the more marks we allow to be taken out of the available lan-
guage, even when they mean nothing to consumers, the greater
the barriers to entry that we are erecting against other firms
that want to get into the same business.29
I do not claim that there are no arguments in favor of a na-
tionwide system of trademark registration. It provides a central
27. The leading post-Lanham Act case is Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores,
Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). For the common-law approach, see, e.g., Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
28. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(1988). For a discussion of the de facto rights created on registration, see Carter, supra
note 10, at 781-87.
29. See Carter, supra note 10, at 768-75.
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register on which marks may be registered and that someone
considering using a mark can search. It puts us in compliance
with various international agreements,30 helps international
trade,31 and facilitates the development of national markets.32
My only claim is that there are considerable costs to a system
that removes from the language marks that mean nothing to
anyone in markets where they are not being used.
The short of it is that trademark is different from patent and
copyright. Though the case for patent and copyright on a na-
tional level is fairly clear, the case for trademark is less clear,
even somewhat shaky. One might decide on balance that na-
tionwide trademark protection is a good thing, and within cer-
tain limits, I incline that way myself. But only within certain
limits, and I confess that many aspects of nationwide protection
leave me uneasy. On the other hand, perhaps a degree of un-
easiness is inevitable; we are talking, after all, about owning
what doesn't exist.
30. See S. REP. No. 515, lOOth Cong., 2d Siess. 7-8, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONGo
& ADMIN. NEWS 5577, 5583-84.
31. See id. at 5, 1988 U.s. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 5581.
32. See DeConcini, The Trademark Law Revision Act, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 382 (1988).
